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THE EFFECTS OF DOGMATISM ON MESSAGE FORMULATION 
Craig Allen Smith 
Over a span of four decades many psychologists have ex-
plored the nature of the "authoritarian personality." 1 
Perhaps the most lucid description of the general "Authori-
tarian Character Structure" is contained in a 1943 article 
by Abraham Maslow, who describes eight characteristics: 
1. A Tendency to Hierarchy -- "regard most or 
all human beings as challenging rivals who 
are either superior (and therefore to be 
feared, resented, bootlicked and admired); 
or inferior (and therefore to be scorned, 
humiliated, and dominated). People are 
ranked on a vertical scale as if they were 
on a ladder, and they are divided into those 
above and below." 
2. A Tendency to Generalize Sup~riority-Inferiority 
Relationships 
3. A Drive for Power 
4. Hostility, Hatred and Prejudice 
5. A Unitary Scale of Values -- other scales become 
threats. 
6. A Tendency to Identify Kindness with Weakness 
7. Sadistic-Masochistic Tendencies --when dominant 
the authoritarian is sadistic, when submissive it 
is masochistic. 
8. Virtually Impossible tb Satisfy any of these needs. 
9. Guilt Feelings and Cbnflicts 2 
In 1950, T. W. Adorno et al introduced the California 
--
F Scale to measure authoritarianism. But since their primary 
purpose was to explore the bases of anti-semitism and facism, 
rather than pure authoritarianism, the F Scale exhibits a 
strong liberal bias. 3 
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To correct for this and other methodological weaknesses 
in the F Scale, Milton Rokeach devised the Dogmatism (D) 
Scale to tap general or topic-free authoritarianism. He 
derived his theory from the premise that authoritarianism 
is related to the structure of one's belief/disbelief systems 
and is therefore independent of content. 4 
The research on Dogmatism to date has been voluminous. 
In their review ofthe literature nearly ten years ago, 
Vacchiano, Strauss, and Hochmann wrote that: 
All in all, if one can evaluate concepts by the 
amount and nature of research they stimulate, dog-
matism, in a short period of time, has proven a 
potent formulation. It has provided a common de-
nominator for such diverse areas as classroom 
teaching and personality development, interpersona! 
behavior and the employment of defense mechanisms. 
But what do we know about the relationship between Dogmatism 
and human communication? 
Gerald Miller and others have studied the effects of 
Dogmatism on message reception fairly extensively. But to 
date we know little about the effects of Dogmatism on verbal 
behavior. This paper will attempt to synthesize our knowledge 
of Dogmatism as an encoding variable. 
II 
First, let us examine the literature to assertain the 
relationships between Dogmatism and some potentially encoder-
related variables. 
Vacchiano, Strauss, and Schiffman administered the D 
Scale and 58 diverse personality instruments to 82 college 
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students and concluded that high dogmatic individuals are 
characterized by a need for support and encouragement, an 
intolerance for the feelings and motives of others, a 
general reluctance to change and preference for the familiar 
despite inconsistencies, a lack of self-esteem and ego 
. 6 
strength and a generally maladjusted personality. When 
Bernhardsen and Fisher replicated the study, however, they 
found a number of spurious relationships. Since they were 
unable to tell precisely which were spurious, they recommend 
that we accept the Vacchiano results with caution. 7 
In terms of behavioral predispositions, we have evidence 
that Dogmatism is positively correlated with a rejection of 
minorities and change-related groups, 8learning difficulties, 9 
. 1 f rnb. . 10 . d d . . k. ft 1nto erance or a 1gu1ty, rap1 ec1s1on-ma 1ng a er a 
11 limited information search, and a tendency to avoid risky 
. t t' 12 s1 ua 1ons. 
We also have some evidence that Dogmatism is negatively 
1 d . h . . 13 d . h th v b 1 corre ate w1t creat1v1ty an w1t scores on e er a 
College Qualification Test14 (although Dogmatism tends to 
d . h 11 d . ) 15 ecrease w1t co ege e ucat1on . 
There is some evidence that Dogmatism is a curvilinear 
predictor of the ability to differentiate between source and 
16 
message. 
Ehrlich and Lee echo Maslow when they conclude that high 
Dogmatics tend to: 
hold negative beliefs about self and others, hold 
contradictory self-beliefs, engage in self-prosely-
tization, seek status and power, report a sense ~7 
martyrdom, and display moral self-righteousness. 
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Much research has explored the relationships between 
the D Scale, the F Scale, and conservatism. One group of 
studies suggests that the D Scale, like the F Scale before 
it, is not topic-free--that conservatives score higher than 
liberals. 18 A second school holds that the D Scale works as 
f . f h . . . 19 Th' a measure o top1c- ree aut or1tar1an1sm. 1s group 
implies that conservatives might just be somewhat more 
authoritarian than liberals. A third group of studies has 
compared the constructs using factor analysis and found that 
d D 1 d b d . . . bl t't' 20 Th ' F an are re ate ut 1scr1m1na e en 1 1es. e1r 
data suggest that D and F are valid constructs when properly 
used, which may routinely correlate with conservatism. 
But, significantly, none of this research has directly 
investigated the influence of D on message formulation. 
III 
In 1964, Haiman and Duns published the results of four 
experiments and concluded that: 
Results in all studies indicated that it was 
possible, with a modest but statistically 
significant degree of assurance, for observers 
to predict subjects' scores on dog~rtism scales 
from their communicative behavior. 
~lthough one could argue that their results were more modest 
than significant, their feat is all the more intriguing 
)ecause they did not identify the characteristics which 
~ignalled the di£ferences between high and low Dogmatic 
;ources. Essentially, they reported that a significant 
tumber of raters guessed correctly . Unfortunately, however, 
10 one pursued this research. 
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But before we can hypothesize and substantiate relation-
ships, we need to explore. There has been a healthy trend in 
recent years toward an appreciation of the "pre-scientific" 22 
or hypothesis-generating functions of rhetorical criticism 
d t t 1 . 23 h 'd 1 h d f 1 an con en ana ys~s. Sc e1 e as suggeste , or examp e, 
that we need different standards for evidence during 
different phases of inquiry: 
The perspective in the first phase is expansive, 
searching, scanning. The findings from multiple 
complimentary approaches are sought. Standards for 
evidence are relatively relaxed. Tacit knowledge 
and intuition are admissable for hypothesis develop-
ment. More speech communication research of this 
type is needed.24 
To this end I conducted three exploratory studies of the 
relationship between Dogmatism and encoding behavior. 
Collectively, they lead us toward some interesting hypothesis 
for more tightly controlled experimental research. 
25 Dogmatism and Written Messages 
A total of 224 students in the introductory communi-
cation course at Purdue University (Fall, 1975) completed the 
Rokeach D and California F Scales. Later in the semester each 
was assigned a two-page persuasive message, aimed at convert-
ing a hostile audience to a position about which the source 
felt more strongly than any other. 26 
The messages were subjected to content analytical pro-
. 27 28 
cedures using the thematic variables of top1c and stance, 
two logical analyses derived from the writings of Stephen 
Toulmin 29 and Carroll Arnold, 30and stylistic analysis based 
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upon average sentence length, "monolithic terms," 31and a 
typology of statements which had proved useful when in-
vestigating the "politically paranoid" discourse of the 
. h s . 32 John B1rc oc1ety. 
The data (N=l48) suggested four significant differences. 
First, both high and low groups used significantly more 
qualifiers per claim than did the moderates. Although such 
apparent curvilinearity is not novel, it is difficult to 
explain with respect to Rokeach's theory. Perhaps most 
reasonable is the contention that high D's qualify because 
they are somewhat defensive, while low D's qualify because 
they perceive finer shades of meaning. 
Second, low D's sought significantly more factual 
judgments than did either medium or high D's. This could 
indicate that low D's are less evaluative than high D's. 33 
Finally, two stylistic variables -- assertions and 
questions -- were inversely related to dogmatism. The 
assertion rate suggests that low D's tend to rely on the 
inherent validity of their assertions, while increasing D 
leads them to more frequently ask and answer the question, 
"according to whom?"~ this is consistent with John Kline's 
description of "people-oriented" and "content-oriented" 
individuals, 34and is not inconsistent with his observation 
that high D's tend to more heavily document their arguments. 35 
The increase in questions could be related either to 
the high D's low self-esteem (and subsequent fear that his 
audience would provide the "wrong" answer to his question) 
36 
upon average sentence length, "monolithic terms," 31and a 
typology of statements which had proved useful when in-
vestigating the "politically paranoid" discourse of the 
h B . h s . 32 Jo n 1rc oc1ety. 
The data {N=l48) suggested four significant differences. 
First, both high and low groups used significantly more 
qualifiers per claim than did the moderates. Although such 
apparent curvilinearity is not novel, it is difficult to 
explain with respect to Rokeach's theory. Perhaps most 
reasonable is the contention that high D's qualify because 
they are somewhat defensive, while low D's qualify because 
they perceive finer shades of meaning. 
Second, low D's sought significantly more factual 
judgments than did either medium or high D's. This could 
indicate that low D's are less evaluative than high D's. 33 
Finally, two stylistic variables -- assertions and 
questions -- were inversely related to dogmatism. The 
assertion rate suggests that low D's tend to rely on the 
inherent validity of their assertions, while increasing D 
leads them to more frequently ask and answer the question, 
"according to whom?"; this is consistent with John Kline's 
description of "people-oriented" and "content-oriented" 
individuals, 34and is not inconsistent with his observation 
that high D's tend to more heavily document their arguments. 35 
The increase in questions could be related either to 
the high D's low self-esteem {and subsequent fear that his 
audience would provide the "wrong" answer to his question) 
37 
or to his desire to provide rather than seek information 
when in a position of dominance over his audience. 
Perhaps most significant, these four sets of differences 
disappeared when the same analyses were partitioned accord-
ing to scores on the California F Scale, despite a D-F 
correlation of .71 (significant beyond .001}. This suggests 
that the discriminable differences between D and F include 
something strongly related to encoding behavior. 
But as interesting as these results were, they failed 
to predict either relative or specific scores with statisti-
cally acceptable accuracy. 
Dogmatism and Oral Messages 36 
Since a sizeable body of literature has described 
differences between oral and written messages, 37and since 
Haiman and Duns reported differential ratings of oral, trans-
cribed, written and interactive messages, 38the first study 
was replicated to determine the effects of D and F on oral 
messages. 
A total of 148 students in the introductory public speak-
ing class at Memphis State University (Spring, 1977} were 
administered the F and D Scales. Later in the semester their 
instructors assigned them a five-minute speech to convert a 
hostile audience on the subject about which the speaker felt 
most strongly. The speeches were recorded (ostensibly to 
familiarize the students with microphone speaking} and sub-
jected to content analytic procedures. 39 
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Somewhat s-urprisingly, in light of the "written" study, 
none of the analyses attained significance at the .05 level. 
The discriminate analyses suggest two functions with F 
probabilities of .88 and .89, while the results of all the 
· r2 f 40 regregress1ons attain an value o only .19. Clearly, 
D and the encoding behavior of this sample (with respect to 
the variables tested) were unrelated. Nor were there any 
statistically significant differences related to the 
California F Scale. Two possible explanations should be 
considered. 
First, it is entirely possible that the difference 
between oral and written styles are such that they over-
come the differences attributable to Dogmatism. Perhaps 
the effects of Dogmatism are brought forth only when an 
individual searches carefully for the "best" way to phrase 
a message. In such a case, Dogmatism would influence the 
writer's judgments as to caution, support and authority. 
For the speaker presenting a thematically prepared but 
extemporaneously phrased message, however, this would be 
less important than his primary goal of fluency. But this 
assumes that the subjects in the written study took great 
pains (or at least minimal discomfort) to forge their per-
suasive messages. This is an assumption that the author 
is somewhat reluctant to make, since most of the messages 
were scrawled in ink on notebook paper in a generally care-
less fashion. Nevertheless, the act of composing on paper 
involves an extra step which may be important in this 
regard. 
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A second possible explanation is that the differences 
in communicative behavior between the rural midwesterners 
from Purdue and the urban southerners from Memphis State 
were more important than either measure of authoritarianism. 
In either case, the results suggest that some intervening 
variable is more important to encoding behavior than dog-
matism. 
IV 
The research to date enables us to formulate some 
general hypotheses for future research. We will divide 
them into sections for organizational purposes, although 
f h . d 41 many o t em are 1nterconnecte . 
A. Since much of the research suggests that D and F 
are related but discriminable entities, we may 
hypothesize that: 
1. D is related to encoding behavior while F is not; 
2. The influence of D on encoding behavior is 
secondary to other influences; 
3. The effects of D on encoding behavior are not 
consistently positive, negative, or curvilinear; 
4. High, medium and low D's tend to adopt similar 
verbal behaviors, presumably for different reasons; 
5. High and low D's will use significantly more 
qualifiers per claim than moderates, but for 
different reasons. 
B. Since D is related to a desire to avoid risk, low 
self-esteem and low creativity, we may hypothesize 
that: 
6. When challenged, high D's should tend to reiterate 
or abandon arguments, while low D's should tend to 
justify and explain their argument; 
7. High D's should prefer friendly to hostile audience 
to a greater degree than low D's; 
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8. Given the same audience, high D's should perceive 
it as generally hostile, low D's as generally 
uncommitted; 
9. Given the opportunity, low D's should be more 
likely to attempt conversion; 
10. Dogmatism should be inversely related to the 
ability to formulate new arguments; 
11. Presented with an opportunity to advance a novel 
argument (e.g., debate), low D's should use it 
more frequently than high D's; 
12. High D's should be better able to reproduce 
arguments for multiple audiences; 
13. High D's should be more likely to reiterate 
arguments, phrases and evidence; 
14. Low D's should ask more questions than high 
D's; 
15. High D's will answer more of the questions they 
ask, unless it is a perceived friendly audience; 
16. Low D's will not answer the questions they ask, 
unless it is a perceived hostile audience. 
C. Since D is related to a tendency to hierarchy, and a 
tendency to generalize superiority-inferiority 
relationships, we may hypothesize that: 
17. High D's should employ proportionately more 
supporting materials than low D's; 
18. High D's should tend to be generally "people 
oriented," low D's more "content oriented" in 
their selection of evidence; 
19. High D's should be more likely to expect audience 
deference to his sources; 
20. When presented as an authority on his subject, 
high D's should tend to forego support and expect 
audience deference while low D's behavior should 
undergo little change; 
21. High D's should be less likely to critique or 
evaluate their sources; 
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22. When faced with an ambiguous situation, low D's 
will describe it, while high D's will evaluate 
it. 
D. Since D is related to the rejection of minorities and 
change, we may hypothesize that: 
23. High D's should adopt anti-minority positions 
more frequently than low D's; 
24. Of those expressing anti-minority views the 
majority should be high D's: 
25. When a radical change is proposed, high D's 
should attempt to preserve the status quo despite 
possible flaws, medium D's should prefer modifi-
cation of the status quo to alleviate the problem, 
and low D's should consider the proposal on its 
own merit. 
E. Since D is negatively correlated with cognitive com-
plexity and the ability to search for new information, 
we may hypothesize that: 
26. High D's should have the most difficulty with 
semantic arguments; 
27. Dogmatism should be negatively correlated with 
message length; 
28. Dogmatism should be positively correlated with 
message oversimplification; 
29. Dogmatism should be negatively correlated with 
message complication; 
30. High D's should perform better than low D's on 
extemporaneous communication assignments; 
31. Low D's should perform better than high D's on 
prepared speech assignments; 
32. In a class involving equal weighting of prepared 
and extemporaneous assignments, medium D's should 
perform the best; 
33. High D's should be most likely to defend their 
remarks, even when they are not overtly challenged. 
F. Because D is related to moral self-right.eousness, we 
may hypothesize that: 
34. Dogmatism should be positively correlated with 
ideological subjects and arguments; 
35. Dogmatism should be positively correlated with 
the vehemence of delivery; 
36. Dogmatism will therefore consistently be con-
fused by raters with: 
a. vehemence 
b. ego-involvement 
c. conservatism 
d. disagreement with the rater 
e. stubbornness 
f. conviction. 
v. 
The kind of research reported here is not intended to 
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be conclusive. In the 23 years since Rokeach introduced the 
D Scale we have turned some stones. We have just begun to 
see that we have only looked at part of the process -- message 
reception. 
The hypotheses presented here are suggestive. They are 
drawn from existing research and are intended to be tested 
using the rigorous procedures that Scheidel posits for 
"phase three" research. But as he warns, we must not be 
overly concerned with testing these or any other hypotheses. 
The important concern is that we test the theory as it is 
reflected in these hypotheses. 
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' # 1 H ' d D t d th t t In Exper1ment a1man an uns repor e a ra ers 
accurately predicted high D's in 83% of the cases from oral 
messages and only 63% when those same messages were transcrib-
ed. Conversely, the same raters accurately predicted low D 
in only 33% of the cases, and increased their accuracy to 67% 
when rating the transcriptions. Thus the transcriptions seem 
most reliable. In Experiment #2, ratings (by those familiar 
with the construct) of written messages were accurate pre-
dictions of high D in 88% of the cases, while the low D 
accuracy was only 36%. 
39 Although it was considerably more difficult to analyze 
recordings than transcriptions, the author felt it important 
to preserve the orality of the messages. The overall inter-
coder reliability coefficient for both studies was .75. Due 
to an unusual technical malfunction, the extremely important 
Toulminian analyses were invalid. More exploratory research 
using the Toulminian ratios is needed in light of the signi-
ficant qualifier-to-claim ratio differences in the "written" 
study. 
40This is consistent with Haiman and Dun's low accuracy 
of low D prediction, but very surprising in light of their 
88% high D oral prediction. It suggests that delivery may 
account for a large part of the variance. 
41These hypotheses are suggestive, not exhaustive. I 
do not intend to imply that any or all of them can be easily 
proven, or that there is no contrary or conflicting evidence. 
r am suggesting _that we have sufficient confidence in them 
to warrant the rigors of "Phase three" research. 
